Is Tokenized Credit One Market or One Company?
Closer to one company than the category name suggests. Research published in July 2026 measured tokenized asset-backed credit at $23.7 billion, of which Figure's HELOC product accounted for $18.3 billion — approximately 31% of the entire $60 billion tokenized market across all twelve asset classes tracked. That single home equity lending business is larger than the whole tokenized US Treasury market, which stood at roughly $15 billion across 100 assets at the same date. Figure claims about 70% share of RWA private credit. Underneath the concentration sits a second figure that matters more: only about 10% of asset-backed credit is distributed, meaning the large majority is recorded on a ledger without being freely tradeable, against roughly 99% distribution for tokenized Treasuries. This guide works through what the numbers describe, why one vertically integrated lender came to define a category, and what an issuer should conclude before treating the headline as a market.
TL;DR — Key Takeaways
- ✓The Concentration: Asset-backed credit at $23.7bn, with Figure's HELOC product at $18.3bn — about 31% of the entire $60bn tokenized market (July 2026).
- ✓The Comparison: That one product is larger than all tokenized US Treasuries, which stood at roughly $15bn across 100 assets.
- ✓The Distribution Gap: About 10% of asset-backed credit is distributed, against roughly 99% for tokenized Treasuries.
- ✓Why One Firm: Figure integrated origination with its own ledger rather than tokenizing third-party loans. The volume is a byproduct of an operating lending business.
- ✓The Reading Error: A HELOC book is not a proxy for institutional private credit. Aggregating them implies diversification the category does not have.
The Largest Tokenized Asset Class Is One Product
Tokenized asset-backed credit stood at $23.7 billion in July 2026. Figure's home equity line of credit product accounted for $18.3 billion of it — around 31% of the entire $60 billion tokenized market across twelve asset classes. It is larger than every tokenized US Treasury product combined.
Market summaries typically report asset-backed credit as the largest tokenized category, which is accurate and misleading in the same sentence. The category is large because one company's consumer lending book is large. Remove it and tokenized credit is a fraction of its reported size, and the sector's overall figure falls by roughly a third.
Asset-backed credit at $23.7 billion, dominated by Figure's HELOC at $18.3 billion, representing 31% of the total market — against tokenized US Treasuries at about $15 billion across 100 assets, of which 16 products hold more than $100 million each.
— “Real State of Tokenization in 2026,” BeInCrypto Research, 10 July 2026
Figures for this product vary by source and date — later counts through 2026 have put it above $20 billion — because it tracks an active origination book rather than a static issuance. The concentration ratio is the durable observation, not the exact level.
Why a Lender, Not a Tokenization Platform, Owns This Category
Figure is the largest non-bank HELOC lender in the US and records those loans on Provenance, the blockchain it developed. The tokenized volume is a byproduct of originating loans at scale, not the result of convincing third-party originators to issue on-chain. Figure claims roughly 70% share of RWA private credit.
This is the structural reason the category has one dominant participant. A tokenization platform has to persuade asset owners to bring existing assets on-chain, which requires them to change process, custody and reporting for a benefit that accrues mostly later. A lender that already controls origination simply records new loans on its own ledger from the start. There is no adoption step, because there is no external party to convince.
| Model | How volume is won | Constraint on growth |
|---|---|---|
| Integrated originator (Figure) | Records its own new loans on its own ledger | Its own origination capacity and credit appetite |
| Tokenization platform | Persuades third-party asset owners to migrate | Client onboarding pipeline; each mandate won individually |
| Fund issuer | Raises capital into a tokenized vehicle | Investor demand and distribution reach |
The first row scales with a lending business; the second scales with a sales pipeline. That difference explains both why Figure's number is so large and why it tells you little about whether tokenization is being adopted by anyone else. It also mirrors the revenue pattern in the only audited accounts the sector has, discussed in why revenue fell while tokenized AUM rose 16%.
Ten Per Cent Distributed, Ninety Per Cent Recorded
Only about 10% of tokenized asset-backed credit is distributed — able to leave the issuing platform and move between holders. Tokenized Treasuries run at roughly 99% distribution on public blockchain rails. Same market, opposite characteristics.
This is the figure that separates a ledger from a market. A loan recorded on a private chain, held by the originator, transferable only with the platform's involvement, has gained operational benefits — a single record, automated servicing, faster reconciliation — and no liquidity. Those benefits are real and they are not the ones the word “tokenized” usually implies to an investor.
What the two categories actually demonstrate
- Asset-backed credit ($23.7bn, ~10% distributed). Proof that tokenization improves loan servicing and record-keeping at scale. Not proof of a secondary market.
- Treasuries (~$15bn, ~99% distributed). Smaller and genuinely tradeable, with 16 products above $100 million each — several venues, several issuers, real transferability.
- The aggregate figure. Adding them produces a market-size number in which the largest component is the least liquid, which flatters the whole.
Both are legitimate uses of the technology. Only one describes assets that investors can buy and sell. The general distinction is set out in whether a token you cannot move is really tokenized.
A HELOC Book Is Not Institutional Private Credit
Home equity lines of credit are consumer loans secured against residential property, underwritten to consumer standards, concentrated in one country and one rate environment. Institutional private credit is direct lending to companies with different underwriting, loss behaviour and investors. The category label hides that.
The practical consequence is that an institution evaluating tokenized private credit on the basis of category size is reading a number generated by a different asset. Loss experience on US home equity lending in a given rate cycle says nothing useful about middle-market direct lending. Nor do the two share investors: a HELOC book is funded by securitisation and whole-loan buyers, while institutional private credit is funded by allocators with entirely separate mandates.
The genuinely institutional tokenized credit market is therefore much smaller than the headline, younger, and carries the underwriting problems documented in who underwrites a tokenized loan — roughly $147 million in recorded defaults attributed to adverse selection, opaque underwriting and borrower misrepresentation. That figure sits against the smaller real number, not against $23.7 billion.
What to Check Before Treating a Category Figure as a Market
Three checks separate a category number from an addressable market: how much of it is one participant, how much of it is distributed, and whether the underlying assets resemble what you intend to issue. Asset-backed credit fails all three for most institutional issuers.
Questions to ask of any tokenized market-size figure
- What is the largest single component? If one product is 31% of the whole market, the aggregate is a proxy for that product.
- How much is distributed? Value recorded on a ledger and value that can trade are different quantities, and only one implies liquidity.
- Is the underlying asset comparable? Consumer secured lending and corporate direct lending share a category label and nothing else that matters.
- Who are the buyers? A category with one dominant originator and thin distribution may have no independent buyer base at all.
None of this diminishes what Figure has built. Recording an $18 billion-plus lending book on-chain with automated servicing is the largest working demonstration that the technology handles real assets at scale, and the operational case is proven by it.
The error is reading that achievement as evidence of a liquid, diversified tokenized credit market. It is evidence that one lender rebuilt its infrastructure well. For the systemic dimension, see whether the tokenized RWA market is too concentrated, and for the structural context our institutional guide to RWA tokenization.
Frequently Asked Questions
How concentrated is tokenized asset-backed credit?
Extremely. Research published in July 2026 put asset-backed credit at $23.7 billion of tokenized value, of which Figure's HELOC product accounted for $18.3 billion — roughly 31% of the entire $60 billion tokenized market across all asset classes. Figure claims about 70% market share in RWA private credit. A single home equity lending business is therefore the largest tokenized real-world asset category, larger than tokenized US Treasuries at around $15 billion at the same date.
What does it mean that only 10% is distributed?
That most of the value is recorded on a ledger but cannot move freely between holders. Distribution measures whether a token can actually leave the issuing platform and trade peer-to-peer. At roughly 10% for asset-backed credit, the large majority is tokenized in the sense of being recorded on-chain and not in the sense of being tradeable. Tokenized Treasuries by contrast maintain about 99% distribution on public blockchain rails, which is why they are considered the mature category despite being smaller.
Why does one company dominate the category?
Because Figure vertically integrated origination with the ledger rather than tokenizing loans it bought from someone else. It is the largest non-bank HELOC lender in the US and records those loans on Provenance, the blockchain it developed. The tokenized volume is a byproduct of an operating lending business at scale, not the result of persuading third-party originators to issue on-chain. That is a difficult model to replicate and it explains why the category has one dominant participant rather than several.
Is a HELOC book a good proxy for the tokenized credit market?
No, and treating it as one distorts the picture. Home equity lines of credit are secured against residential property, underwritten to consumer lending standards, and concentrated in a single jurisdiction and rate environment. Institutional private credit — direct lending to companies, asset-based finance, specialty lending — has different underwriting, different loss behaviour and different investors. Aggregating them into one headline number implies a diversified market that does not exist.
What is the risk in this concentration?
Correlated exposure presented as category growth. If a single product is 31% of all tokenized value, the market's headline figure moves with one company's origination volume and one asset class's performance. A downturn in US residential credit, a change in that company's strategy, or an operational failure at one platform would move the sector's reported size in a way that has nothing to do with tokenization adoption elsewhere.
What should an issuer take from these numbers?
That category size is not evidence of a functioning market for a new entrant. An issuer entering tokenized credit is not joining a $23.7 billion liquid market; it is entering a category where one vertically integrated lender holds most of the value and roughly 90% of it does not trade. The relevant questions are who the buyers are, whether the instrument can leave the issuing platform, and what comparable secondary activity exists — none of which the headline figure answers.
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